Security and professional secrecy (Art. 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code)
What protects the secrecy of your files
We name the operator, the models and the encryption, so that your adviser can check instead of taking our word for it. The essentials fit in five lines; the detail follows, one part per topic.
- Your files stay on your own computer; only the extracts needed for the task are sent to the Swiss operator. The publisher never receives the slightest content: only usage statistics (steps, counters, error codes).
- Nothing is sent without your approval; produced documents await your approval (unless you explicitly waive it); edits to an existing document you designated apply at once and remain reversible.
- Every AI call goes through a Swiss operator — it is the very architecture of the product, there is nothing to choose or switch on.
- The AI’s web tools are switched off by default: no request leaves for a third party outside Switzerland on the AI’s initiative, unless you explicitly switch on web mode — switching it on is then your decision and your responsibility.
- You can make folders completely unreadable to the AI.
The measures, in plain words
What each protection does
Each card describes a protection that LEMIA is designed to provide — a best-efforts obligation, not a promise of results. We start with what each one prevents; what makes it hold is named further down, in the technical detail.
Everything happens on your own computer
Your files never go off “into the publisher’s cloud”: the publisher neither hosts them nor reads them. One contact is still required: the workstation checks its licence at least once per offline window (24 hours by default, set for your practice) and stops working past that, until the next check (the FAQ has the detail).
The agents stay inside the folders you open
The AI can only open the folders you entrust to it, and nothing beyond. You can also mark folders as completely unreadable to it: it can neither open them nor even know what is inside.
Everything goes through Switzerland, by design
AI processing is entrusted to a Swiss operator (INFOMANIAK NETWORK SA, Geneva), in its own data centres in Switzerland — for text as well as for your images, scanned documents and recordings to transcribe. As for the tools the AI could use to reach a service abroad, they are off by default — unless you explicitly switch on web mode, and that decision is then yours.
A holding area before your real files
Documents the AI produces are first prepared in a holding area, off to one side. No new document reaches your real files until you have approved it; only the ones you keep are copied across — unless you choose, in Settings, to skip that step. Correcting a document that already exists, by contrast, applies straight away — and can still be undone.
Nothing is sent without your approval
The application sends no email and triggers no external action on your behalf: to date, it has no connector to your mailbox or to any online service. A document it produces is handed over with your own tools, exactly as if you had written it yourself. Should connectors be offered one day, every send would be shown to you with its content in front of you, for your approval.
Your access keys in an encrypted vault
Your access keys are kept in an encrypted vault on your machine; the workstation calling Infomaniak uses the key in the clear at the moment of the call, as does any software that uses an API key.
Encrypted logs that stay with you
LEMIA keeps a technical record of its actions so that you can check what happened. That log is encrypted on your machine and never leaves it. What reaches the publisher is limited to technical metadata (counters, durations, statuses): no content and no file names appear in it.
Protection in several layers
Security does not hang on a single setting someone might forget to switch on. If one protection gives way, another holds in its place. And when in doubt, the system fails closed rather than open.
In one diagram
Several layers between the world and your files
The measures above fit inside one another: for a new document to reach your files, it has to pass through every layer in turn. A correction to a document you have pointed to takes a shorter path — it applies straight away, and can still be undone.
Your computer
Working perimeter
Holding area
Your approval
The holding area
Two possible outcomes — only one leads to your files
New documents produced by the agents wait in the holding area. From there, there are only two outcomes: you approve, and the result is written to your files; you refuse, and it is written nowhere. Unless you choose to skip that step in Settings, your decision is the only way a new document reaches your files.
A document that already exists and that you ask to have corrected, renamed or deleted does not go that way: the change applies straight away, to the very document you pointed to. What protects you there is not the wait but the way back: a copy of the original is set aside before any change, and if that copy cannot be made, the change is refused.
The named detail
What we use, precisely
Each line below names what we use — openly, and with its limits: enough to check every promise on this page, point by point.
| What is at stake | What we use |
|---|---|
| AI processing | Infomaniak (INFOMANIAK NETWORK SA, Geneva, Switzerland) — a Swiss operator, in its own data centres in Switzerland |
| Models | Qwen3.5 (397B) to read, analyse, draft and check each step; Mistral-Small-4 to judge a finished workflow run and read your images; Whisper to transcribe your recordings; Ministral-3 for a security check of the text files given to a workflow (detection of hidden instructions): always on, it covers neither Word, PDF, spreadsheet and image files, nor Conversation and Agents. Two further models remain accepted by the software without being offered for selection: Nemotron and Kimi K2.6. All open-weight models, served in Switzerland — this list is complete |
| Your files | they stay on your own computer; only the excerpts required for the requested task are sent to the Swiss operator |
| Key vault | AES-256-GCM encryption, with a 256-bit key kept on your machine and protected by DPAPI (Windows); never displayed in the clear, never exported; the workstation calling Infomaniak uses the key in the clear at the moment of the call, as does any software that uses an API key |
| Run logs (content of requests) | encrypted at rest on your machine. If encryption is unavailable, LEMIA refuses to write the log rather than write it in the clear |
| Processing log (Art. 4 DPO) | without the content of requests, file names neutralised; kept on your machine, out of the agents’ reach, not encrypted |
| What reaches the publisher | technical markers only — steps, counters, durations, verdicts, error codes, the name of the model called and an estimated cost; the detail is just below |
| The AI’s web tools | switched off by default: the AI cannot query a service located outside Switzerland unless you turn on the optional web mode (globe button, warning to accept) — the AI is then instructed never to put anything sensitive in its queries, and turning it on is your responsibility |
| Forbidden folders | a red list that you maintain, over the folders you open: you can make folders completely unreadable to the AI |
| Register and logging | register of processing activities (Art. 12 FADP) and logging (Art. 4 DPO, the Swiss Data Protection Ordinance), kept for at least one year, exportable as a dated file |
The limit, since it has to be said. DPAPI protection of the vault applies within the perimeter of your Windows account: it puts your keys beyond the reach of another user of the machine and of a copy of the disk, but not of a program already running under your own session. That is the limit of any desktop software; we would rather say so than stay quiet about it.
What reaches the publisher
An allowlist, closed by default
For the licence to work, a few technical markers leave your computer. They do not go through a filter that strips out what is forbidden — it is the other way round: only explicitly allowed fields get through, and any unexpected field is rejected. Automated tests fail if content crosses that boundary, and the separation is re-checked on every change to the software.
run 4f2a… step 3 / 5
status done tokens 1,240 in / 380 out
time 12.4 s verdict acceptedThat is what we see. What never appears in it: your texts, your instructions, the content produced, and even the names of your files.
Network check
What leaves the computer, and where it goes
One day, a client, your adviser or the data protection authority will ask where the documents go. Here is the answer, and how to check it without taking our word for it. LEMIA runs on your own computer; during a task it talks to a handful of destinations, each one named in its code. Only a few modules of that code, also named, are allowed to import a networking library: if any other module imported one of the libraries our tests know by name, our own test suite would fail.
| Destination | When | What travels there |
|---|---|---|
| api.infomaniak.com Infomaniak AI Services, Switzerland |
on every AI call | the excerpts of your documents the task needs (or the recording to transcribe) and the agent’s instructions, under your key — processed in Switzerland, never read by the publisher |
| api.lemia.ch the publisher’s control server, Switzerland |
at start-up, then every 15 minutes (every minute while the workstation is blocked); while a task is running, at the checkpoints between two steps; when you download a reference register | technical markers only: step identifiers, counters, verdicts, error codes, the name of the model called, an estimated cost. The filter is a closed allowlist: no text, file name or instruction gets through |
| lemia.ch | at start-up (update check, list of published registers); when you download a reference register | a version number; for the list of registers, the workstation’s session token; for a register, the workstation’s session token and the name of the requested package — no content. The package comes over HTTPS from lemia.ch only; its signature and its checksum are verified before installation |
| the web Brave, then DuckDuckGo as a fallback; the pages the AI opens |
only if you turn web mode on — globe button, a warning to accept, consent that lapses | the AI’s search queries, with the instruction to put nothing sensitive in them — an instruction, not a guarantee. They go through Brave Search (public page) or, failing that, DuckDuckGo — companies established in the United States, which receive your workstation’s IP address; through the Brave API (api.search.brave.com) if your practice has set its own key. Brave is queried first; DuckDuckGo receives a query only if Brave failed or returned nothing for that query, or failed shortly before — between five minutes and two hours at most, depending on recent failures — or once the caution limit on Brave’s public page is reached (five searches in ten minutes on the workstation). One engine at a time, never both together |
- Nowhere else. No analytics, no automatic crash report to a third party, no font fetched from a server: the application is served from your own computer.
- What you send yourself is not in this record. A document you approved and then sent from your own mail client is your doing, through your own account — the AI never initiates it.
- A local model (Ollama, no network egress) exists for offline development; it is not offered in normal use.
Try it yourself
How to check it yourself
Nothing to install. You take the reading yourself, on your own computer, with a fictional file — never a real one.
Open the Resource Monitor
Windows key, type resmon, Network tab. Tick the
LEMIA, node and python processes in the top list.
Run a task on a fictional file
In the Agents space, an ordinary request: “a summary of these documents, in Word”.
Note the remote addresses
The “TCP Connections” table lists every address contacted by the ticked processes, for the whole task.
Resolve the names
In a command prompt, nslookup followed by the address returns the
server’s name.
Compare with the list
Every name should match a row in the table above. A name that is not there deserves a question — ask us, and we will answer in full.
This describes the software as it is built, not a guarantee about your network: an antivirus, a corporate proxy or any other open application makes its own connections, which will appear alongside.
Evidence
The compliance file, as the application produces it
The day someone asks for your evidence, there is nothing to write: one button in the Compliance space, and out comes a dated Word document. No AI touches it: it is built from the computer’s actual logs and configuration, so it cannot say anything other than what the software does. The register, web mode, data-subject operations and the processing log are set out in tables.
The “Étude Exemple” (“Example Firm”) does not exist: its controller is a fictitious person and its register was made up for the example — three processing operations on an invented matter. The structure, the measures and the retention periods are exactly what the application writes for a real practice. The file itself is in French.
What it contains
Four excerpts, translated from the file
The register of activities (Art. 12 FADP)
One table per purpose, aggregated from every processing operation, letter by letter of Art. 12 para. 2. Never any content, never a file name. Eight rows out of ten:
Heading Entry Purpose (let. b) Draft deed from an engagement letter Nature of the processing Agents (work in the folders) — 1 operation(s), period: 27.08.2026 → 27.08.2026 Categories of data subjects (let. c) clients (legal entities) Categories of personal data (let. c) engagement letter, meeting notes Categories of recipients (let. d) Infomaniak (Switzerland) Retention period (let. e) 90 days, then automatic purge Disclosure abroad (let. g) No disclosure of personal data abroad Country of AI processing CH
The processing rules (Art. 5 DPO, the Swiss Data Protection Ordinance)
The technical and organisational measures, written from the configuration at the time of export. Three lines among those in the file:
“Every call to an AI model is routed to Infomaniak AI Services (Switzerland): the content is processed in Switzerland, is not retained durably by the sub-processor (temporary storage for the duration of processing — Infomaniak LLM API special terms, Art. 6) and is not used to train models.”
“Forbidden folders (red list): the folders locked by the practice are physically unreadable to the agents and to the conversational assistant. State at the time of export: 0 forbidden folder(s) across 0 protected workspace(s).”
“Editing, renaming or deleting a document the user has designated applies immediately. The safeguard is then not the wait but reversibility: the original is copied to a local recycle bin and the action recorded in an undo journal before the document is modified — if the backup fails, the write is refused. The user can undo each action, one by one.”
The forbidden-folder count is that of the fictitious computer: on yours, it shows your own red list.
Logging (Art. 4 DPO), sub-processors (Art. 9), breaches (Art. 24)
The logging summary — records, period, retention of at least 365 days, independent of the content purge — the table of sub-processors with their country and their safeguards, the breach log, and the data-subject operations, each one dated.
Records: 3 (of which 3 under sovereign processing)
Period covered: 24.08.2026 → 02.09.2026
Processing operations with web mode on: 1 (web-mode consents recorded: 1)
Retention: at least 365 days (Art. 4 para. 5 DPO), independently of the content purge
Data security breaches (Art. 24 FADP)
No breach documented to date.
Web mode and the processing log, line by line
Every operation carried out with web mode on is dated, with its workstation and its activity; so is every acceptance of the warning. In the appendix, one line per operation. What was searched for is not there: that would be content, and it is not kept.
“Web mode was on during these operations: search queries may have gone to the engines named in the register. The text of the queries and the pages opened are not kept.”
Date and time Workstation Activity (purpose) Nature 02.09.2026 11:11 poste-7Q4K Summary of a litigation file for the insurer Conversation Appendix — Processing log (Art. 4 DPO)
Date and time Workstation Nature Purpose Models Country Files read Files written Web mode 24.08.2026 10:19 poste-7Q4K Agents (work in the folders) Summary of a litigation file for the insurer Qwen3.5-397B CH 4 1 no 27.08.2026 15:52 poste-7Q4K Agents (work in the folders) Draft deed from an engagement letter Qwen3.5-397B CH 2 1 no 02.09.2026 11:11 poste-7Q4K Conversation Summary of a litigation file for the insurer Qwen3.5-397B CH 1 0 yes
Limits
What this file does not do
- It only covers processing done through LEMIA. It is attached to the practice’s data-protection records; it does not replace the register of processing carried out by other means.
- It does not make a practice “compliant”. Our measures are best-efforts obligations: full compliance depends on the data-processing agreement and on your own situation, to be confirmed with your legal adviser.
- It does not write the rest for you. The fields only the practice knows — the controller’s identity, the purposes when you have not filled them in — are marked “to be completed”, never guessed.
Burden of proof
Who builds the compliance file?
Your professional body does not answer yes or no: it names the routes a covered file may take. The Swiss Bar Association recognises three: software installed and run on the firm’s own internal network, on the guarantee that no data leaves it or is stored outside the firm’s infrastructure; strict compliance with the outsourcing rules; or, with the client’s informed consent, a written waiver of professional secrecy and of data protection law. And it adds that in the absence of those safeguards, confidential information must not be entered into AI systems (Guidelines on the use of artificial intelligence, 14 June 2024, ch. 2.1). The Swiss Medical Association asks, for patient data, for technical and legal guarantees of exclusively local or controlled processing (recommendations on large language models, 14 August 2025).
LEMIA is built for the second route, outsourcing, and its job is to hand you the evidence it calls for: one named sub-processor, in Switzerland, a register written from the application’s own logs, and a dated file. That route is open to anyone: what matters is what your provider gives you in writing — and what falls to you is sticking to the route you chose, and being able to show it.
On the point that decides — the AI call itself — the paperwork does not fall to us. You open your own account with the Swiss operator and you use your own key: whoever processes the content of your files is therefore your sub-processor, on your terms, with nobody in between. What the publisher puts in writing covers the rest, and it is narrower: what the software sends, what it does not send, and the licence metadata — the only flow that reaches us (how the routing works, what it changes on the invoice).
| What is needed | With a public AI tool | With LEMIA |
|---|---|---|
| Processing by a Swiss operator | for you to configure and verify: region, sub-processors, service settings | the default state: every AI call goes through Infomaniak, nothing to switch on |
| Who can read the content | the provider, under its contract and the law it is subject to | processed in Switzerland, never read by the publisher |
| The register of activities (Art. 12 FADP) and logging (Art. 4 DPO) | kept by hand, and for you to organise | produced by the application: a dated Word file, ready for your legal adviser or for the FDPIC — see one for a fictitious practice |
| Approval of every deliverable | for you to organise within your practice | built in: no new document reaches your folders without your approval, and any change to an existing one can be undone |
Our measures are best-efforts obligations: full compliance depends on the data-processing agreement and on your own situation, to be confirmed with your legal adviser.
Three common confusions
What looks alike, and is not equivalent
The vocabulary of confidentiality is now shared by the whole market. Three distinctions still decide what actually protects you. Put them to any vendor — us included.
Locating is not leaving a jurisdiction
A server located in Switzerland but operated by a company subject to US law remains within the scope of that law. The right question is therefore not “where are the machines”, but who operates them, and under which law. Ours is a Swiss operator, named above. We develop this point just below.
A contractual undertaking is not an architectural property
“Your data does not train the models” is almost always a contract clause — ours included, and we say so: that undertaking is passed on by contract to the Swiss operator. What is architectural is who can technically read: the software runs on your own computer, and the publisher does not receive your content.
Encrypting your storage is not holding the access key
Bringing your own encryption key protects files at rest at a provider who nonetheless continues to run the processing. Here, the key that opens access to the model is yours, in your vault, on your machine: it is your account that calls the AI, not ours.
Sovereignty
Hosting in Switzerland is not enough. Sovereignty is
For a professional bound by secrecy (Art. 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code), the real test is not where the servers sit, but who can be legally compelled to grant access to them. Hosting data in Switzerland answers a data-protection question. But hosting it also means entrusting it to a provider. Professional secrecy then asks another one: can that provider be compelled to open your files? A “Swiss region” operated by a group subject to foreign law remains exposed.
“My data is in a Swiss region.”
An extraterritorial access law — the US CLOUD Act (18 U.S.C. § 2713), for instance — targets the operator subject to US law and compels it to produce the data “regardless of whether… located within or outside of the United States” — hence even in a “Swiss region”. What matters is not the flag flying over the data centre, but the law the operator is subject to.
A Swiss operator, in its own data centres in Switzerland
Your AI processing goes, without exception, through a Swiss operator (INFOMANIAK NETWORK SA, Geneva), in its own data centres in Switzerland.
Everything else runs on your own computer
The software works on your own machine: your content is never read by the publisher, nothing is sent without your approval, and any change to an existing document can be undone. Those are the measures described further up this page.
What we do not claim. The exact threshold at which a foreign cloud becomes inadmissible has not been settled by the courts: that assessment is a matter for your own professional judgement. Our argument rests on the legal risk of compulsion, not on proven cases.
- Extraterritorial access — CLOUD Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2713: compels an operator subject to US law to produce the data “regardless of whether… located within or outside of the United States” — the obligation applies even in a “Swiss region”.
The risk of foreign access is legally established, but no case has been publicly documented involving Swiss data (sealed proceedings). The wider picture of professional secrecy (Art. 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code, the revised Federal Act on Data Protection) is set out below.
The law that binds you, by profession
Every profession has its secret — and its article of law
The core of the law that binds you often fits in a single article: Art. 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code punishes whoever unlawfully discloses a secret entrusted to them in the practice of their profession — an offence prosecuted on complaint, punishable by a custodial sentence of up to three years or a monetary penalty. It covers a closed circle of professions; other regimes add to it or extend it. A reassuring point: auxiliaries are themselves bound by secrecy (Art. 321 para. 1 of the Swiss Criminal Code), and disclosure remains non-punishable with the consent of the person concerned or the written authorisation of the superior authority (para. 2).
Doctors and allied health professionals
Medical secrecy falls under Art. 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code, complemented by Art. 40 of the Medical Professions Act (MedPA/LPMéd) and cantonal law. Health, diagnoses, patient records: these are, in addition, sensitive data within the meaning of the revised Federal Act on Data Protection (FADP) — Art. 5 FADP.
Lawyers
On top of the secrecy of Art. 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code comes Art. 13 of the Lawyers Act (LLCA): a reinforced secrecy, covering all matters entrusted, unlimited in time and enforceable against third parties.
Notaries
Notaries are covered by Art. 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code and by cantonal law (for instance, in Geneva, Art. 7 of the Notarial Act, LNot). The exact scope varies from canton to canton.
Public sector and administration
Civil servants and public officials — civil registry, disability insurance offices, land registry, tax assessment — are bound by official secrecy (Art. 320 of the Swiss Criminal Code). Lifting it requires the written consent of the superior authority.
Banking and audit
Banking secrecy (Art. 47 of the Banking Act, BankA/LB) is a criminal-law regime; the licensed audit body is bound by the secrecy of Art. 730b of the Swiss Code of Obligations: licensed audit is the only fiduciary activity backed by a criminal-law secrecy duty (Art. 321 of the Swiss Criminal Code).
“Pure” fiduciaries (outside Art. 321)
Fiduciaries (Swiss accounting and trust firms) not covered by Art. 321 remain bound by the agent’s duty of loyalty (Art. 398 para. 2 of the Swiss Code of Obligations), which Art. 162 of the Swiss Criminal Code backs with a criminal sanction — it covers disclosing a business secret one was bound to keep “under a statutory or contractual duty” — and by the fallback regime of the FADP (Art. 62). The duty of discretion exists; only its legal basis changes.
Two points to remember: the sanction is a criminal one and is triggered on complaint; and your auxiliaries do not put you at fault — they are themselves bound by secrecy (Art. 321 para. 1 of the Swiss Criminal Code), and disclosure remains non-punishable with the consent of the person concerned or the written authorisation of the superior authority (para. 2).
Data protection, on top
The FADP adds to secrecy — it does not replace it
On top of professional secrecy sits a second, cumulative regime: the FADP. It applies to any personal data, and its requirements bind you whether or not you fall under Art. 321.
- Mere routing is already “processing” (Art. 5 FADP) — even without reading. Passing a piece of data through a third-party service means processing it; the same article defines sensitive data (health, intimate sphere, genetic or biometric data, criminal proceedings and sanctions…).
- Art. 8 FADP requires data security: that is the obligation answered by the measures described above — encryption, compartmentalisation, logging.
- Art. 9 FADP governs processing entrusted to a third party, under instruction and subject to security safeguards: this is the basis of the data processing agreement (DPA). Since your practice accesses the AI models using its own access keys, that agreement is entered into directly between your practice and the AI provider — the Publisher is not a party to it (see the Terms of Use, art. 5.1 and 11.2, and the privacy policy, §3).
- Art. 21 FADP governs decisions taken “exclusively by automated means”: you are the one who decides — you review every output before it has any effect on anyone else, and the software triggers no external action without your approval. That classification is thereby ruled out.
- And above all: the fine (Art. 60 and 61 FADP) — up to CHF 250,000, imposed on the responsible natural person — and not on the company. The most concrete lever of the law that binds you.
If your practice extends its activity into the European Union, the GDPR applies in addition (processing on behalf of a controller, Art. 28; impact assessment, Art. 35).
What LEMIA does with it, in one sentence: your content is processed in Switzerland, by design and without exception; it is never read by the publisher, and every output is reviewed and approved by you before anything is sent; any change to your existing documents can be undone. Sovereign processing answers the question of transfers abroad; human approval answers the question of automated decision-making; and the fact that your content is never read, together with the data processing agreement, answers professional secrecy and the FADP.
Verifiable guarantees
Every promise has its clause, and its proof
We do not ask you to take our word for it: every commitment below is in writing — in our Terms of Use, and therefore enforceable, or in the product documentation — and matches a mechanism in the product that you can see for yourself during a demonstration.
Content never read by the publisher
Committed: Terms of Use Art. 4.2 and 11.2 — the publisher receives neither your documents nor the content produced. Verifiable: the software runs on your own computer; only technical markers (steps, counters) exist on the publisher’s side, never your texts.
Swiss operator, written into the architecture
Committed: Terms of Use Art. 4.3 — the elements needed for processing are transmitted only to the Swiss operator. Verifiable: no setting and no menu lets your data be sent to an AI outside Switzerland — the restriction is built into the structure of the software, not into an option.
Human approval, and a way back
Committed: Terms of Use Art. 4.4 — nothing is sent without your explicit approval; documents produced wait for your approval (unless you explicitly waive it); changes to a document that already exists apply straight away and remain reversible. Verifiable: ask for an amount to be corrected in one of your own documents — the correction applies, and “Undo” reverses it. Try a send too: nothing goes out on its own.
Forbidden folders, genuinely unreadable
Committed: a documented product feature (the Compliance space). Verifiable: put a folder on the red list, then ask the AI to read it — it can neither open it nor list its contents.
Register and compliance file
Committed: processing logs (Art. 4 DPO, the Swiss Data Protection Ordinance) kept for at least one year. Verifiable: the Compliance space exports a dated compliance file in one click, ready to hand to the FDPIC (the Swiss data protection authority) or to your legal adviser.
Transparency about AI
Committed: Terms of Use Art. 8 — content is generated by AI systems, may contain errors and does not constitute professional advice. Verifiable: the information appears in the interface itself, not only in the contract.
What we do not claim
Trust is also earned by stating the limits
Our measures are best-efforts obligations, not a guarantee of invulnerability: no system is “100% tamper-proof”. Legal compliance also depends on the data processing agreement and on your own situation: you remain the data controller within the meaning of the FADP, and your external sends remain your decision. We do not claim to be “compliant by design”.
Have your adviser read this page
We are happy to answer any question about how your files are protected — in detail.
Reporting a security vulnerability: write to contact@lemia.ch, describing what you observed and how to reproduce it, without attaching any third-party data. We acknowledge receipt and keep you informed of the follow-up.